Abstract: In Hume’s cognitive psychology, the concept of probability is part of a family of concepts that also includes the concepts of so-called “secondary qualities” (such as colors), humor, beauty, and virtue—concepts now sometimes characterized as “response-dependent.” Just as the concept of beauty fundamentally structures the domain of aesthetic value and the concept of virtue fundamentally structures the domain of moral value for Hume, so the concept of probable truth fundamentally structures the domain of epistemic value. Understanding how the concept of probable truth originates and achieves normative status illuminates otherwise puzzling features of Hume’s treatment of skepticism.

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