My research explores the analogies and disanalogies between theoretical reasoning (i.e., reasoning aimed at determining what one should believe, disbelieve or suspend) and practical reasoning (i.e., reasoning aimed at determining what one should intend).

PHIL 3152.10 TR 12:45-2:00

PHIL 4192.10 TR 3:45-5:00

“Wondering about What You Know.” (2018) Analysis 78 (4): 596-604.

“Trying Cognitivism: A Defence of the Strong Belief Thesis.” (2018) Theoria 84 (2): 140-156.

“Do We Need Partial Intentions?” (2017) Philosophia 45 (3): 995-1005.

“Do Desires Provide Reasons?” (2016) Philosophical Studies 173 (8): 2011-2027.

“Reconceiving Direction of Fit.” (2015) Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2): 171-180.

"Are Desires Beliefs about Normative Reasons?" (2019) Analytic Philosophy 61 (3): 236-251.

"Agnosticism, Inquiry, and Unanswerable Questions" (2019) Disputatio 11 (53):63-88.

"The Aim of Inquiry" (forthcoming) Disputatio

Ph.D. Columbia University, 2013

M.Phil. University of St Andrews, 2008

M.A. Harvard University, 2002

B.A. Andrews University, 2000