My research explores the analogies and disanalogies between theoretical reasoning (i.e., reasoning aimed at determining what one should believe, disbelieve or suspend) and practical reasoning (i.e., reasoning aimed at determining what one should intend).

PHIL 3152.10 TR 12:45-2:00

PHIL 4192.10 TR 3:45-5:00

The Questioning-Attitude Account of Agnosticism (2022) Synthese 200 (498): 1-15.

The Aim of Inquiry (2021) Disputatio 13 (61): 95-119.

Are Desires Beliefs about Normative Reasons? (2019) Analytic Philosophy 61 (3): 236-251.

Agnosticism, Inquiry, and Unanswerable Questions (2019) Disputatio 11 (53):63-88.

Wondering about What You Know (2018) Analysis 78 (4): 596-604

Trying Cognitivism: A Defence of the Strong Belief Thesis (2018) Theoria 84 (2): 140-156

Do We Need Partial Intentions? (2017) Philosophia 45 (3): 995-1005

Do Desires Provide Reasons? (2016) Philosophical Studies 173 (8): 2011-2027. 

Reconceiving Direction of Fit (2016) Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2): 171-180.

Ph.D. Columbia University, 2013

M.Phil. University of St Andrews, 2008

M.A. Harvard University, 2002

B.A. Andrews University, 2000