Avery Archer

My research explores the analogies and disanalogies between theoretical reasoning (i.e., reasoning aimed at determining what one should believe, disbelieve or suspend) and practical reasoning (i.e., reasoning aimed at determining what one should intend).

PHIL 3152.10 TR 12:45-2:00

PHIL 4192.10 TR 3:45-5:00

REFEREED PUBLICATIONS

• Agnosticism-Involving Doxastic Inconsistency (2023) Erkenntnis: 1–16.
• The Questioning-Attitude Account of Agnosticism (2022) Synthese 200 (498): 1–15.
• The Aim of Inquiry (2021) Disputatio 13 (61): 95–119.
• Are Desires Beliefs about Normative Reasons? (2019) Analytic Philosophy 61 (3): 236–251.
• Agnosticism, Inquiry, and Unanswerable Questions (2019) Disputatio 11 (53): 63–88.
• Wondering about What You Know (2018) Analysis 78 (4): 596–604.
• Trying Cognitivism: A Defence of the Strong Belief Thesis (2018) Theoria 84 (2): 140–156.
• Do We Need Partial Intentions? (2017) Philosophia 45 (3): 995–1005.
• Do Desires Provide Reasons? (2016) Philosophical Studies 173 (8): 2011–2027.
• Reconceiving Direction of Fit (2016) Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2): 171–180.

BOOKS AND BOOK CHAPTERS

• The Attitude of Agnosticism (2024) Cambridge University Press.
• Agnosticism (forthcoming) in Blackwell Companion to Epistemology (3rd Edition).

Ph.D. Columbia University, 2013

M.Phil. University of St Andrews, 2008

M.A. Harvard University, 2002

B.A. Andrews University, 2000